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Abstract 
This study investigates whether a company’s founders affect the combination of 
executive, grey and independent directors on its board at the time of initial public offering 
(IPO) in the UK. Particularly, we analyse how venture capitalists are associated with 
board structure in founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. We find that UK 
IPO firms managed by founders tend to have more executive directors. Further, they are 
more likely to stack non-executive directors with more independent directors relative to 
grey directors. Venture capital ownership is not significantly associated with board 
structure at the IPO stage. However, further evidence suggests that venture capital 
ownership is negatively related to the percentage of executive directors and positively 
related to the percentage of grey directors in the founder-managed firms. 
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1. Introduction 
Firms dominated by founders represent a unique organisational structure and 
governance regime (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). The existing studies primarily focus on the 
association between founders and firm performance in the context of established firms 
(e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Fahlenbrach, 2009). While the presence of founders is a 
common feature at the time of initial public offering (IPO), the literature on how they 
affect organisational arrangement at this stage is scarce (Certo et al., 2009; Gao & Jain, 
2011). Recent studies have stated that a board is structured as a response to its firm’s 
governance regime, and they call for a better understanding of the determinants of board 
structure and the forces that drive its development (Harris & Raviv, 2008; Raheja, 2005). 
This paper adds to the literature and investigates how founders affect board structure at 
the IPO in the UK. Additionally, although there is significant research on founders and 
institutional shareholders, there is limited research on the nexus between them. This study 
highlights different agency environments in founder-managed and non-founder-managed 
firms (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; Cable & Shane, 1997), and it examines how venture 
capitalists, as powerful outside shareholders, are associated with board structure in the 
presence or absence of founder managers in IPO firms. 
Board structure affects its functionality, and the composition of a board usually 
reflects the desires of various parties interested in a firm (Adams et al., 2010). Firms 
often establish a formal board for the first time at the IPO (Wang & Song, 2016). The role 
of the board revolves around two contrasting functions (Baker & Gompers, 2003): (1) an 
IPO firm may need a board that can effectively play strategic and advisory roles for 
enhancing its growth and responding to external competition during the IPO stage; (2) the 
3 
 
IPO is the first time that a private firm raises equity from dispersed shareholders, and 
from the agency perspective, the increased dispersion of ownership may intensify agency 
conflict and thus increase the demand for effective monitoring from the board. It is 
argued that the way in which a board is structured to satisfy its multiple functional roles 
is dependent on its firm’s governance regime (Harris & Raviv, 2008). The existing 
powerful insiders or shareholders in a firm undergoing IPO may have a strong incentive 
to exercise their influence to ensure that the prevalent functionality from the board, as 
determined by the board structure, can enhance or preserve their interests (Gao & Jain, 
2012). 
Founders are the longest-tenured members in a firm and play a critical role in 
directing decisions at the time of the IPO (Gao & Jain, 2011; Wang & Song, 2016). They 
usually have substantial share ownership, as well as psychological ownership, and hold 
important management positions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). They therefore have 
substantial interests and controlling power. As noted above, an IPO is commonly 
accompanied by an increased dispersion of shareholding. The changes in ownership 
structure may potentially threaten the interests of the existing owners (Baker & Gompers, 
2003). This may motivate founders to use their influence to establish a board that is 
optimal for their best interests, minimising any costs they incur as a result of the changes 
of ownership structure and other governance characteristics. While there is no agreement 
on what constitutes an optimal configuration of directors, we argue that an IPO firm’s 
board composition is influenced by the interests of its founders, because the board will be 
structured to substitute or complement the corporate governance functions played by 
them. 
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Because board structure is associated with the distribution of power in a firm, it is 
usually an outcome of bargaining between dominant insiders and outside investors. Prior 
literature has suggested that an IPO firm’s board will be framed to reflect concerns and 
interests of influential external shareholders such as venture capitalists, because those 
shareholders have a significant voice in the appointment of board members (e.g., Baker & 
Gompers, 2003). The provision of venture capital is often critical to the success of IPO 
firms. Operationally, venture capitalists’ relationship with entrepreneurs usually goes 
beyond the simple provision of finance. They usually exhibit more active involvement in 
various corporate activities in the firms, such as management oversight and strategy 
development, to safeguard their investment (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). However, 
founders and venture capitalists are likely to have different objectives and interests in a 
business (Higashide & Birley, 2002). Such differences may result in principal–principal 
agency conflicts (Cable & Shane, 1997; Zou et al., 2016), thus motivating venture 
capitalists to protect their interests through their negotiation power over corporate 
governance arrangements (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). We therefore argue that venture 
capitalists’ attitude toward board arrangements is dependent on the presence/absence of 
founder managers. While the overriding governance objective of a firm may be inclined 
towards the preference of its founders, such an objective may deviate in the presence of 
greater venture capital ownership. 
By examining UK non-financial companies that went public on the main market of 
the London Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2013, we find that the IPO firms managed 
by founders are more likely to have a greater percentage of executive directors on their 
boards. In addition, the founder-managed IPO firms tend to stack their non-executive 
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directors (NEDs) with more independent directors relative to non-independent directors 
(also known as grey directors).1
This paper seeks to add to the existing literature in a number of ways. First, as 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) note, relatively few studies have researched the 
determinants of board structure. It has been argued that founder managers differ from 
non-founder managers in terms of their interests, power, incentives and knowledge (Gao 
& Jain, 2011). As discussed above, the study’s focus on the impact of founders on board 
structure has so far attracted little attention in prior literature. Similarly, there is limited 
knowledge about how venture capitalists react to different internal governance regimes. 
This paper highlights the potential principal–principal agency conflicts between founders 
and venture capitalists, and investigates how venture capital ownership is associated with 
board structure in the presence or absence of founder managers. This study thus addresses 
significant gaps in the literature on determinants of board structure. 
 Venture capital ownership is not significantly related to 
the percentages of executive, grey and independent directors, but further evidence 
suggests that founder-managed IPO firms are more likely to have more grey directors and 
fewer executive directors in the presence of greater venture capital ownership. 
Second, the prevalent functional role for a board is impacted by its structure (Harris 
& Raviv, 2008). Some recent studies have conceptually or empirically examined the 
effectiveness of executive, grey and independent directors in fulfilling different board 
tasks (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Borokhovich et al., 2014; Hsu & Wu, 2014),2
                                                      
1
 The definition used to classify independent non-executive directors and non-independent non-executive 
directors (grey directors) will be further discussed in Section 3.2. 
 but 
little is known about when those specific types of directors will be chosen. This research 
2
 Section 2.1 provides further discussions in respect of the features of executive, grey and independent 
directors. 
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gives equal consideration to the features of those different types of directors and 
highlights the influences of founders and venture capitalists on the combination of those 
directors. 
Third, a further contribution of this study lies in its emphasis on the UK setting. 
While there has been little research on the determinants of board structure, and previous 
studies have primarily focused on US firms (e.g., Baker & Gompers, 2003; Boone et al., 
2007; Linck et al., 2008), the UK context provides several distinctive features and 
potentially offers new insights into the determinants of board structure at the IPO stage. 
Prior studies have documented that founders own around 31% of shares in their founding 
firms in the UK (Chahine et al., 2011), which is higher than the 22% for their US 
counterparts (Gao & Jain, 2011; He, 2008). In addition, venture capitalists have around 
3% of the ownership of IPO firms in the UK (Filatotchev, 2006), which is significantly 
lower than the 23.6% in the US (Florin, 2005). It appears that founders’ ownership is 
significantly higher than that held by venture capitalists in the founder-managed IPO 
firms in the UK. 
Furthermore, NEDs in the UK firms, compared to their US counterparts, may be 
arguably less effective in monitoring managerial conduct (Guest, 2008). It has been 
suggested that NEDs face relatively lower litigation risk in the UK because lawsuits 
against them are very rare (Franks et al., 2001). Moreover, the compensation for NEDs is 
relatively low in the UK (Cosh & Hughes, 1987; Mallin et al., 2015). These factors will 
affect NEDs’ incentives to contribute their time and efforts to their duties. 
As for the regulatory environment, UK firms have more flexibility than US firms to 
determine their board structure, since compliance with the UK corporate governance code 
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is on a ‘comply or explain’ basis (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014). Therefore, 
IPO firms in the UK face less strict ongoing corporate governance regulation after 
flotation, allowing them more freedom to decide their preferred board structure. Such a 
governance environment provides a relatively clear setting for research on how an IPO 
firm’s board structure is determined. Collectively, the above-mentioned governance and 
regulatory characteristics in the UK may affect the views and propensities of founders 
and venture capitalists in the process of selecting board members. Therefore, the UK 
provides an important and interesting setting to investigate corporate governance issues. 
This paper is organised into five parts. Following the introduction, we review the 
extant literature and develop our hypotheses. We then describe the sample selection 
procedure and research design. This is followed by the results and discussion. The final 
section draws conclusions. 
2. Hypotheses Development 
2.1 Board structure at IPO 
The board of directors is ultimately responsible for directing a firm’s 
decision-making. Each director plays different roles to fulfil various functions regarding 
monitoring, strategy formulation, advising and resource acquisition (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Board structure is therefore crucial to firm performance. It has been suggested that 
a combination of executive, independent and grey directors are appointed to ensure a 
board’s success in managing its multiple functions (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). 
Executive, independent and grey directors are different in nature. A firm’s 
characteristics affect the combination of those different types of directors on its board in 
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order to fulfil the firm’s relative need for various board functions (Coles et al., 2008). 
Operationally, executive directors are involved in day-to-day management functions in a 
firm. They have good stewardship and work closely with the management team (Davis et 
al., 1997). Their firm-specific knowledge enables them to play an effective advisory role 
for decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Nevertheless, it has been suggested that an 
increased number of executive directors on a board may lead to managerial entrenchment 
and intensify the agency conflict between management and external investors (Raheja, 
2005). 
In contrast, both independent and grey directors are NEDs with no day-to-day 
executive duties. However, they differ from each other in terms of their ties with firms 
beyond their non-executive positions. While grey directors have significant economic or 
personal affiliations with a firm, independent directors are strict outsiders.3
Operationally, independent directors are expected to be tough monitors (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2007). From the agency perspective, independent directors are more likely to 
objectively challenge managerial decisions because they are relatively distant from the 
firm and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, they are motivated to oversee 
top management in order to protect their reputation in the external labour market (Fama, 
1980). In contrast, it is argued that independent directors do not possess sufficient 
 It is argued 
that the presence or absence of such affiliations affects those directors’ capacities and 
incentives in performing their monitoring, advisory and resource-dependence roles 
(Adams, 2009; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Borokhovich et al., 2014; Hsu & Wu, 
2014). 
                                                      
3
 This study adopts the criteria set by the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) to distinguish 
independent and grey directors. See footnote 6 for the precise criteria. 
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firm-specific information, nor do they understand the business thoroughly, because they 
generally serve on a part-time basis (Raheja, 2005). Further, their strict monitoring duty 
is likely to discourage executive directors from sharing privileged information with them 
in order to avoid intense scrutiny (Adams & Ferreira, 2007). This may lead to 
independent directors relying on their general knowledge rather than firm-specific 
knowledge in performing monitoring roles, thus impairing their effectiveness. As noted 
previously, it is argued that independent directors in the UK, compared to the US, receive 
lower compensation and face lower litigation risk (Cosh & Hughes, 1987; Franks et al., 
2001; Mallin et al., 2015), and they may therefore be less incentivised to contribute their 
efforts and time to their duties thus playing a weaker monitoring role (e.g., Guest, 2008).  
From the agency perspective, grey directors’ affiliations with a firm may reduce 
their incentives to act against management, thus placing them in a compromised position 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). However, the presence of personal and economic ties could 
enable grey directors to access critical firm-specific information and develop a better 
collaborative working relationship with management. Such relationships can facilitate 
information flow among board members, thus increasing valuable interactions for 
decision-making (Borokhovich et al., 2014). In addition, grey directors’ interests in the 
firm provide them with greater incentives than independent directors to contribute their 
effort and time to the firm they serve (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). While independent 
directors are generally regarded as strict monitors by corporate governance reformers, 
some argue that grey directors are more confident and powerful and more likely to 
challenge management when necessary (Borokhovich et al., 2014; Buchanan II, 1974). 
Grey directors possess firm-specific information, experiences and skills acquired through 
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their affiliations with the firm, which can be of benefit to their monitoring functions, 
particularly when they serve a firm with greater information asymmetry (Borokhovich et 
al., 2014; Buchanan II, 1974). In addition, their incentive to contribute to oversight 
activities may be stronger than that of independent directors because they are confronted 
with an increased risk to their financial and personal interests when a firm faces greater 
uncertainty and challenges (Borokhovich et al., 2014). The presence of such interests may 
even give grey directors motivation to monitor management constructively, thereby 
securing their interests in the firm. Therefore, grey directors act in the combined role of 
executive director when providing advice and resources and independent director when 
playing the monitoring role (Borokhovich et al., 2014; Hsu & Wu, 2014) 
As noted above, IPO firms face the challenges of increasing agency conflicts and 
seeking advice and resources to facilitate their growth. The composition of the board is 
therefore critical to how IPO firms respond to these two challenges. This provides 
powerful managers or investors, such as founders and venture capitalists, with incentives 
to exercise their influence to establish a board that maximises and safeguards their own 
interests as well as securing their authority. Board composition at the time of an IPO may 
therefore be determined by the choices of those managers and investors and made to 
serve their interests, or be a reflection of an organisation’s design of corporate 
governance in response to the potential agency problem arising from the presence of 
entrenched insiders (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
2.2 Founders and board structure 
Founders play a central role from the time a firm is established. They typically hold 
an important managerial position such as that of CEO or a position on the board, and they 
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retain a large proportion of the firm’s ownership. Founders are the longest-tenured 
members in the firm. Their human capital is valuable to firms due to their innovative 
nature and firm-specific knowledge and experience. Founders are therefore in a better 
position to formulate effective strategies (Certo et al., 2001). These features enable 
founders to have significant power and capability to influence a firm’s policies and 
organisational structure (He, 2008; Nelson, 2003). 
Prior studies also provide arguments regarding the presence of founders in an 
organisation (Gao & Jain, 2011). From the agency perspective, founders’ significant 
controlling power and ownership may enable them to be entrenched and to act in their 
own interests (La Porta et al., 1999). The increasingly dispersed ownership structure at 
the IPO stage may increase the divergence of interests between founders and shareholders 
and consequently give founders an incentive and opportunity to pursue their private 
interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Further, such changes in ownership may 
also motivate founders to retain their authority and legitimacy in the firms by taking 
advantage of their bargaining position (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
As board structure is associated with the distribution of power in a firm, dominant 
insiders such as founders usually seek to minimise effective monitoring from the board of 
directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). They are inclined to choose 
directors who are more likely to support their decisions and less likely to challenge their 
power (Jaggi & Leung, 2007; Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999). Consequently, founders are 
more likely to prefer more executive directors in order to centralise their control and 
avoid challenges and oversight from NEDs. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1a: IPO firms managed by founders or with higher founder ownership 
are more likely to have a higher proportion of executive directors on their boards. 
There is greater information asymmetry in IPO firms. Founders, as powerful insiders, 
are likely to exploit their superior access to information at the expense of other 
shareholders in order to maximise their interests and minimise their costs incurred by the 
changes of ownership structure (Gao & Jain, 2012). They are typically reluctant to offer 
critical information to outsiders to avoid informed monitoring (Harris & Raviv, 2008; 
Jensen, 1993). As discussed above, the quality of information available to independent 
directors is always at insiders’ discretion (e.g., Chancharat et al., 2012; Duchin et al., 
2010; Harris & Raviv, 2008). The capability of independent directors to oversee 
management may therefore be confined by their lack of firm-specific knowledge in firms 
dominated by founders. Grey directors, compared to independent directors, may have 
better informational advantage to effectively challenge management in order to protect 
their own interests (Borokhovich et al., 2014; Hsu & Wu 2014). We therefore argue that 
founders are more likely to prefer more independent directors relative to grey directors in 
order to safeguard their authority and avoid intensive oversight from grey directors. 
Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b: IPO firms managed by founders or with greater founder ownership 
are more (less) likely to stack their NEDs with independent (grey) directors on their 
boards. 
2.3 Venture capitalists and board structure 
Venture capitalists have influential power at the time of an IPO. Investment by 
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venture capitalists is growing in European countries (Chahine et al., 2007). It is 
documented that the UK is more likely to attract investment by venture capitalists among 
these countries because this capital market is larger, has higher liquidity and has better 
investor protection (Groh et al., 2010).4
Since board structure is critical to post-IPO performance and the likelihood of IPO 
survival (Chancharat et al., 2012; Kroll et al., 2007), venture capitalists have strong 
incentives to be involved in human capital arrangements and to influence the 
development of the top management team at the IPO stage in order to ensure the best 
outcomes for their investment (Hellmann & Puri, 2002). Additionally, they have greater 
incentives to monitor and constrain managerial discretions through their negotiating 
power in order to safeguard their profits (Baker & Gompers, 2003; Boone et al., 2007; 
Shekhar & Stapledon, 2007). As discussed above, a new IPO firm has increased demand 
for both monitoring and advisory functions from its board in order to deal with the 
increased competition and challenges in the market. We therefore argue that venture 
capitalists do not prefer insider-dominated boards, leaning more towards boards with 
external inputs that offer effective monitoring and/or advice. This study therefore 
 Venture capitalists are important sources of 
capital for entrepreneurial firms and play multiple roles beyond the funds they invest to 
assist an IPO firm in responding to the competitive environment. Venture capitalists view 
an IPO as an attractive opportunity to exit and realise their profits. In order to maximise 
their returns when exiting portfolio firms, venture capitalists actively offer support to 
ventures in different aspects, such as management mentoring, strategy development and 
resource acquisition. 
                                                      
4
 Alhadab et al. (2015) statistically document that 22.1% of IPOs were venture-backed firms in the UK 
during the period from 1998 to 2008. 
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formulates the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative (positive) relationship between venture capital 
ownership and the proportion of executive directors (NEDs) on the boards of IPO 
firms. 
2.4 Venture capitalists and board structure in founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed IPO firms 
As discussed previously, founder-managed firms have a unique governance regime, 
as founder managers differ from non-founder managers in terms of their managerial 
incentives, interests, power and knowledge (Gao & Jain, 2011). Although founders have 
good firm-specific knowledge, they may not possess the expertise and experience 
required to manage the complexity of publicly traded companies (e.g., Adams et al., 2009; 
Wasserman, 2006). Venture capitalists are equipped with the skills and resources that 
could compensate for this shortcoming (Certo et al., 2001; Daily & Dalton, 1992). Their 
knowledge and access to networks in the market increase the credibility of a firm and 
decrease the costs incurred throughout the process of an IPO. IPO firms backed by 
venture capital tend to receive a positive response from investors, as the involvement of 
venture capitalists signals certification of firm value (Busaba et al., 2001; Busaba, 2006; 
Dunbar & Foerster, 2008). Venture capitalists are therefore more likely to be invited by 
founders to invest in a venture firm with a high uncertainty of future profitability, because 
founders expect that venture capitalists’ investment and involvement can add value to the 
entrepreneurial firm as well as helping to diversify their risk incurred in the process of 
going public (Amit et al., 1990). 
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However, founders are incentivised to enhance or preserve their domination in order 
to protect their own economic and non-economic wealth associated with their founding 
firms (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). They usually view venture capitalists as strict monitors. 
While venture capitalists need to utilise firm-specific information to enhance their 
functional roles, the availability of such information is always at the discretion of the 
founders, who are usually reluctant to share critical insider information with venture 
capitalists (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2004). To maintain their inherent legitimacy and control, 
founder managers may attempt to withhold firm-specific information in order to avoid 
informed challenges posed by venture capitalists, even if this action may negatively 
impact firm value (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Gedajlovic et al., 2004; Le et al., 2013). 
Such entrenchment behaviour often puts founders at odds with venture capitalists, and 
may be a threat to the interests of venture capitalists. 
Operationally, venture capitalists face significant investment risk because the failure 
rate of venture-backed firms is high (Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). The principal–principal 
agency conflict associated with the asymmetric power and divergent interests between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs is a risk to the potential success of these firms, and it 
consequently poses a significant threat to the financial return for venture capitalists 
(Cable & Shane, 1997; Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000). Therefore, venture capitalists have 
strong incentives to exercise power over the firms they invest in and attempt to sway the 
activities of these firms and their entrepreneurs. They will act to ensure that an effective 
corporate governance mechanism is in place to safeguard their investment. 
Prior literature suggests that venture capitalists will use their bargaining power to 
negotiate a preferred board structure when an IPO firm is managed by founders 
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(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Kaplan & Strömberg, 2003, 2004; Lerner, 1995). As discussed 
above, grey directors, compared to independent directors, have better informational 
advantages and economic incentives to constructively monitor the process and strategy of 
the firm. Their affiliations with the firm will also enable them to act like inside directors 
on decision-making (Borokhovich et al., 2014; Buchanan II, 1974). We therefore argue 
that venture capitalists would strategically favour a board composed of more grey 
directors in founder-managed IPO firms. This study therefore formulates the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between venture capital ownership and the 
proportion of grey directors is more pronounced in founder-managed IPO firms. 
3. Research Methods 
3.1 Sample selection 
This study examines the influence of founders and venture capitalists on the 
composition of board structure at an IPO stage. The empirical tests examine UK 
non-financial firms that went public on the main market of the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) between 1998 and 2013.5,6
                                                      
5
 The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) on the London Stock Exchange may provide an alternative 
setting for our analysis. However, the AIM has lower listing and disclosure requirements than the main 
market (Espenlaub et al., 2012). Farag et al. (2014) have reported that the level of corporate governance 
information disclosed in IPO prospectuses varies among the firms undergoing an IPO in the AIM. This 
issue may potentially restrict the availability and consistency of such information required for our analysis. 
Firms undergoing an IPO in the main market face more stringent listing and disclosure requirements, thus 
providing more details about corporate governance information in their IPO prospectuses. Our analysis 
therefore emphasises the firms on the main market.  
 An initial sample of 217 firms is drawn from the LSE 
New Issues files. Corporate governance and accounting data of each sample firm are 
6
 This study excludes financial companies due to the fact that they are often subject to special rules and 
recommendations and their financial structure is distinct from other companies. 
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manually collected from IPO prospectuses. Firms without a complete set of corporate 
governance and financial data are excluded from our initial sample. Data of venture 
capital-backed IPO firms is identified based on the British Venture Capital Association 
(BVCA) Directory, Venture Capital Report Guide to Venture Capital in the UK, European 
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) online directory and Pratt’s Guide to Venture 
Capital Sources. The final sample is composed of 210 IPOs. 
3.2 Regression model and specification 
To investigate our hypotheses, OLS regression is employed. The general models are 
developed as follows: 
ED, INED, GREY or INED_NED  ȕ0 + ȕ1FDR_MGDi ȕ2FDR_OWNi ȕ3VC_OWNi 
ȕ4CEO_AGEi ȕ5LEVi + ȕ6LnCOM_SIZi + ȕ7LnCOM_AGEi ȕ8UNDERWRITERi + 
ȕ9FCFi + ei                                    
where 
ED  = the percentage of executive directors on board; 
INED  = the percentage of independent NEDs on board; 
GREY  = the percentage of non-independent (grey) NEDs on board; 
IND_NED  = the ratio of independent directors to total NEDs; 
FDR_MGD  = the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO 
or chairman, coded 1 if the positions of CEO and/or 
chairman are held by the founder, or 0 otherwise; 
FDR_OWN  = the percentage of the company shares owned by founders; 
VC_OWN  = the percentage of the company shares owned by venture 
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capitalists; 
CEO_AGE  = the age of CEOs; 
LEV  = the ratio of total debts to total assets; 
LnCOM_SIZ  = natural log of total assets (proxy for firm size); 
LnCOM_AGE  = natural log of company age; 
UNDERWRITER  = underwriter reputation measured by the market share of 
the underwriter across the sample period; 
FCF  = the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. 
For dependent variables, we measure board structure by the percentages of executive 
directors (ED), independent NEDs (INED) and grey directors (GREY) on the main board. 
We use the independent/non-independent NED distinction set out in the UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2014, para. B.1.1.) to classify independent and grey directors. 7
For independent variables, we employ the presence of founders who hold the 
position of CEO or chairman of the board (FDR_MGD) to classify founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The percentage of a firm’s shares 
controlled by its founders is used to measure the founders’ ownership (FDR_OWN). 
 
Relying on this approach, an NED is coded as a grey director if this person has economic 
or personal affiliations with the firm, as set out in the Code. The ratio of independent 
NEDs to total NEDs (INED_NED) is used to measure the composition of NEDs on 
boards. 
                                                      
7
 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) sets precise criteria for independence on the basis of 
whether a director: (a) has been an employee of the company or group within the last five years; (b) has or 
had in the last three years a material business relationship with the company; (c) has received additional 
remuneration such as a performance-related payment and pension from the company apart from a director’s 
fee; (d) has close family ties with the company’s other directors, advisors, or senior employees; (e) holds 
cross-directorships; (f) represents a significant shareholder; or (g) has served on the board for more than 
nine years. This approach is also employed by Hsu and Wu (2014). 
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Those two variables are adopted to capture the influence of founders on a company. The 
percentage of a firm’s shares owned by venture capitalists (VC_OWN) is used to measure 
the interest and influence of the venture capitalist(s) in that company. 
The control variables are drawn from prior studies. This research employs five 
groups of control variables. First, CEO age (CEO_AGE) is controlled for a CEO’s 
personal characteristics relating to the sense of job security, risk propensity and 
commitment to a firm (e.g., Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). It is 
thus expected that CEO age has an impact on an organisation’s governance arrangement 
for its boards. 
Second, leverage (LEV) may contribute to managerial entrenchment. Managers may 
increase leverage to reinforce their control and reduce the discipline of the market for 
corporate control (e.g., Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988). In contrast, the use of debts 
may restrict managers’ control over free cash flow and increase the scrutiny from 
debtholders (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1986). Leverage may therefore affect the demand for 
monitoring from the board. 
Third, company size (LnCOM_SIZ) and company age (LnCOM_AGE) are used to 
control for the complexity and scope of a firm’s operation (e.g., Linck et al., 2008). The 
effect of company size and company age on board arrangement is ambiguous, but both 
are positively related to board independence because the benefit of monitoring increases. 
In contrast, the demand for board monitoring may be greater in small and young firms 
because those firms typically have higher risk. 
Fourth, the reputation of the underwriter (UNDERWRITER) is controlled. It is 
suggested that underwriters play a critical role in certifying the quality of the IPOs during 
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the floatation (Carter & Manaster, 1990; Migliorati & Vismara, 2014). Underwriters with 
higher market share have higher incentives to maintain their reputation in the capital 
market. Therefore, they are more likely to use their bargaining power to affect board 
composition to ensure the success of the floatation (Boone et al., 2007). 
Finally, we use the ratio of free cash flow8
4. Results 
 to total assets (FCF) to capture the 
agency problem of the firms. It is argued that managers in firms with higher free cash 
flow are more likely to be entrenched (Jensen, 1986). The presence of higher managerial 
entrenchment increases the propensity of managers to exercise their influence to reduce 
board oversight in such firms, thus increasing the number of executive directors (Coles et 
al., 2008). 
4.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all the sample firms. In addition, it 
displays the statistics for the founder-managed IPOs compared to the 
non-founder-managed IPOs and reports the results of the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test for each variable. Of the sample firms, 46% are founder-managed IPOs and 54% 
are non-founder-managed IPOs (FDR_MGD). On average, 46.41%, 36.85% and 16.71% 
of members on a new IPO’s board are executive directors (ED), independent directors 
(INED) and grey directors (GREY), respectively. The mean percentages of executive 
directors for the founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms are 51.69% and 
42.81%, respectively, and this difference is statistically significant (p < 0.01). It appears 
                                                      
8
 Free cash flow is equal to operation earnings plus depreciation charge less capital expenditure. 
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that the boards of the founder-managed firms are generally controlled by executive 
directors. The findings support Hypothesis 1a, which states that founder-managed firms 
are likely to have a greater percentage of executive directors on their boards. 
The average percentages of grey directors (GREY) for the founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed firms are 12.47% and 20.28%, respectively, and this difference is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), indicating that more grey directors are employed by the 
non-founder-managed firms than the founder-managed firms. However, the mean 
percentages of independent directors (INED) for the founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed firms are 36.84% and 36.91%, respectively, but this difference is 
not significant. Compared to the non-founder-managed firms, the founder-managed firms 
have a significantly higher ratio of independent directors to total NEDs (INED_NED) (p 
< 0.01). This result appears to indicate that, with regard to the composition of NEDs, 
founder-managed IPOs are more likely to increase the representation of independent 
directors relative to grey directors on their boards. 
On average, 14.07% and 4.86%9 of the shares are owned by founders (FDR_OWN) 
and venture capitalists (VC_OWN) 10
                                                      
9
 This finding is higher than the 2.93% reported by Filatotchev (2006) in terms of IPO firms in the main 
market and the AIM. 
, respectively, at the IPO stage. The average 
ownership of shares by founders (FDR_OWN) is 27.83% and 2.49% for the 
founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms, respectively, and this difference is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01). However, there is no significant difference in the 
percentage of shares owned by venture capitalists (VC_OWN) between the 
founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. The venture capitalists own an 
10
 Of our sample firms, 27.62% are backed by venture capitalists. 
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average of 4.28% 11
As for the control variables, the average age of CEOs (CEO_AGE) is 47.27. The 
CEOs’ ages for the non-founder-managed IPOs are significantly higher than those for 
their founder-managed counterparts (p < 0.01). Compared to the non-founder-managed 
firms, the founder-managed firms have lower leverage ratio (LEV) (p < 0.01) and smaller 
company size (LnCOM_SIZ) (p < 0.01). On average, the founder-managed firms are 
younger than the non-founder-managed firms (COM_AGE) (p < 0.01). In addition, the 
non-founder-managed firms are inclined to nominate a more reputable underwriter 
(UNDERWRITER) (Wilcoxon test: p < 0.05). The founder-managed firms have a 
significantly lower ratio of free cash flow to total assets (FCF) than their 
non-founder-managed counterparts (t-test: p < 0.05), suggesting a potentially higher 
agency problem in the non-founder-managed firms. 
 and 5.35% of the shares in the founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed IPOs, respectively.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Results and discussions of the regression analysis 
Table 2 presents correlations between the variables adopted in regression analysis. 
Multicollinearity in regression analysis may be considered harmful when correlations 
                                                      
11
 This is consistent with the findings of previous studies by Chahine et al. (2007, 2011) that report 4.28% 
and 4.2% of ownership being held by venture capitalists, respectively, in the founder-involved IPOs. 
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exceed 0.7 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The correlations between independent variables 
employed in each regression model in this research are below 0.43. In addition, the 
variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all the cases presented in Tables 3 to 9 are below 2.0, 
which is lower than the threshold value of 10 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The results of 
these examinations suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our regression 
models. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression models used to investigate the 
association between founders, venture capital ownership and the percentage of executive 
directors on boards (ED) at the IPO stage. The results suggest that the IPO firms managed 
by founders (FDR_MGD) are more likely to have more executive directors on their 
boards (Model 1, p < 0.05). The percentage of executive directors on a board is positively 
related to the proportion of the company shares owned by founders (FDR_OWN) (Model 
2, p < 0.01). These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1a, which states that executive 
directors are more likely to be nominated in the founder-managed firms, because 
founders are inclined to have more executive directors on their boards in order to 
strengthen their authority for effective decision-making and to protect their own interests 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2006).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 presents the results for the associations between founders, venture capital 
ownership and the percentages of independent directors and grey directors. As indicated 
above, both independent directors and grey directors are NEDs, but they may play 
different corporate governance roles in a firm. The results show that founder-managed 
firms (FDR_MGD) tend to have a higher percentage of independent directors (INED) 
(Model 1, p < 0.05) while having a lower percentage of grey directors (GREY) (Model 2, 
p < 0.05). Similarly, an IPO firm with higher founder ownership (FDR_OWN) is more 
likely to have more independent directors (INED) (Model 4, p < 0.10) and fewer grey 
directors (GREY) (Model 5, p < 0.01). Models 3 and 6 in Table 4 further examine 
whether the weight of independent directors relative to grey directors on a board is 
greater for founder-managed firms and is associated with founder ownership. The 
findings demonstrate that the ratio of independent directors to total NEDs (INED_NED) 
is higher in founder-managed firms (FDR_MGD) (Model 3, p < 0.01) and is positively 
related to founder ownership (FDR_OWN) (Model 6, p < 0.01). The findings suggest that 
an IPO firm with influential founders is more likely to stack its NEDs with more 
independent directors, instead of grey directors, which is consistent with Hypothesis 1b. 
Such findings may imply that founders may be inclined to nominate fewer grey directors 
on their boards in order to avoid effective monitoring from those directors, because grey 
directors, as noted previously, are argued to be better informed and have greater 
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incentives than independent directors to carry out oversight activities to protect their 
interests when a firm faces greater uncertainty and challenges such as those arising when 
undergoing an IPO (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Borokhovich et al., 2014). 
With regard to the relationship between venture capital ownership and board 
structure, Table 3 shows that the percentage of executive directors (ED) is not 
significantly related to venture capital ownership (VC_OWN), which does not support 
Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, Table 4 demonstrates that venture capital ownership 
(VC_OWN) is not significantly associated with the percentages of independent directors 
(INED) and grey directors (GREY) either. The findings are different from the existing 
studies grounded in the US, which show that firms backed by venture capital have more 
independent directors and fewer executive directors (Baker & Gompers, 2003; Boone et 
al., 2007). 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 5 explores the effect of venture capital on the choice of board members in the 
founder-managed and non-founder-managed IPO firms. With regard to the 
founder-managed firms, Model 1 shows a negative association between the percentage of 
executive directors (ED) and venture capital ownership (VC_OWN) (p < 0.01). No 
significant association is found between the percentage of independent directors (INED) 
and venture capital ownership (VC_OWN) (Model 2), while the percentage of grey 
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directors (GREY) has a significantly positive association with venture capital ownership 
(Model 3, p < 0.05). Model 4 further shows that there is a negative relationship between 
the ratio of independent directors to the total number of NEDs (INED_NED) and the 
venture capital ownership (VC_OWN) in the founder-managed firms (p < 0.1), suggesting 
that the founder-managed firms with a greater percentage of shares controlled by venture 
capitalists are more likely to stack their NEDs with grey directors rather than independent 
directors.  
However, the percentages of executive directors (ED) (Model 5), independent 
directors (INED) (Model 6) and grey directors (GREY) (Model 7), as well as the ratio of 
independent directors to total NEDs (INED_NED) (Model 8), are not significantly related 
to venture capital ownership (VC_OWN) in the non-founder-managed firms. Overall, the 
findings support Hypothesis 3 and imply that venture capitalists are inclined to appoint 
more grey directors, who, due to their firm-specific knowledge and economic ties to a 
firm, may effectively mitigate the potential conflicts arising from the information 
asymmetry and the principal–principal agency problem between founder-managers and 
themselves, thus promoting their mutual collaboration in the venture-backed IPO firms. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.3 Additional analysis 
We conduct additional robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings. First, 
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Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) argue that CEOs are less likely to appoint directors who 
would effectively monitor them. Since members of a nomination committee can make 
decisions on appointments of directors (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2014), we use 
the presence of founders on the committee as an alternative proxy to examine founders’ 
influences on board structure. The presence of founders on a nomination committee 
(FDR_NC) is measured by a dummy variable given a value of 1 if a founder serves on the 
committee, or 0 otherwise. Table 6 reports that IPO firms with founders on a nomination 
committee (FDR_NC) are more likely to appoint more executive directors (ED) (Model 1, 
p < 0.05). In addition, firms tend to appoint more independent directors (INED) (Model 2, 
p < 0.10) and fewer grey directors (GREY) (Model 3, p < 0.05) when there are founders 
serving on a nomination committee (FDR_NC). The presence of founders on a 
nomination committee (FDR_NC) is also positively related to the ratio of independent 
directors to total NEDs (INED_NED) (Model 4, p < 0.01). These results support the main 
findings reported in Tables 3 and 4 showing that founder-managed IPOs are inclined to 
appoint executive directors and stack NEDs with independent directors on their boards. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Second, prior studies have suggested that institutional investors generally control 
significant shareholdings and play an active monitoring role in UK firms (Short & 
Keasey, 1999). We therefore perform additional tests by replacing venture capital 
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ownership with institutional ownership in the regression analysis to examine the effect of 
institutional investors on an IPO firm’s board structure. Institutional ownership 
(INS_OWN) is measured by the percentage of the company shares owned by institutional 
shareholders. Table 7 shows that, generally, institutional ownership is not significantly 
associated with the percentage of executive directors (ED) (Model 1), independent 
directors (INED) (Model 2) and grey directors (GREY) (Model 3) on a board at the IPO 
stage. However, Panel A of Table 8 shows a negative relationship between the percentage 
of executive directors (ED) and institutional ownership (INS_OWN) in the 
founder-managed firms (Model 1, p < 0.05). Institutional ownership (INS_OWN) is not 
significantly associated with the percentage of independent directors (INED) in the IPO 
firms led by founders (Model 2), while the percentage of grey directors (GREY) has a 
significantly positive relationship with the percentage of institutional ownership 
(INS_OWN) in such firms (Model 3, p < 0.01). Model 4 further shows that there is a 
significantly negative association between the ratio of independent directors to the total 
number of NEDs (INED_NED) and institutional ownership (INS_OWN) in the 
founder-managed firms (Model 4, p < 0.05). Panel B of Table 8 further shows that the 
percentage of institutional ownership is not significantly associated with the percentages 
of executive directors (ED) (Model 1), independent directors (INED) (Model 2) and grey 
directors (GREY) (Model 3) in the non-founder-managed firms. Overall, these results 
reflect that the effect of institutional investors on board structure is consistent with that of 
venture capitalists presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
Third, venture capitalists and business angels are two major types of private equity. 
Prior literature argues that, similar to venture capitalists, business angels also actively 
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exercise their monitoring function over their investees (e.g., Bruton et al., 2010; Chahine 
et al., 2007). We therefore examine how business angel ownership affects board structure 
in IPO firms. We measure business angel ownership (ANGEL_OWN) by the percentage 
of the company shares owned by business angels. 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Table 7 reports that the 
shareholdings held by business angels (ANGEL_OWN) is not significantly associated 
with the percentages of executive directors (ED) (Model 5), independent directors (INED) 
(Model 6) and grey directors (GREY) (Model 7). Unlike the effects of venture capital 
ownership reported in Table 5, Table 8 shows that business angel ownership 
(ANGEL_OWN) is not significantly related to the percentages of the different types of 
directors on a board in either founder-managed or non-founder-managed IPO firms 
(Panels A and B of Models 5 to 8). 
 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                      
12
 Consistent with Bruton et al. (2010), we define business angels as those invested in the venture as 
private individuals not affiliated with founders, other board members, senior managers, or venture 
capitalists. 
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Fourth, we adopt an alternative approach suggested by Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash 
(2011) to classify NEDs. They argue that NEDs are more likely to provide effective 
monitoring when serving on a minimum of two out of three major board sub-committees 
(audit, remuneration and nomination committees), as they would contribute more time to 
the firm and gain better knowledge about its operation. Table 9 shows that IPO firms 
with founder managers (FDR_MGD) (Model 1, p < 0.05) and greater founder ownership 
(FDR_OWN) (Model 2, p < 0.05) are less likely to have a higher proportion of NEDs 
who serve on at least two oversight committees (NED_COMS). Additionally, Table 9 
also reveals that there is a positive relationship between venture capital ownership 
(VC_OWN) and the percentage of NEDs holding membership of two or more oversight 
committees (NED_COMS) in the founder-managed firms (Model 3, p < 0.01). However, 
this relationship is not significant in the non-founder-managed firms (Model 4). The 
results are in line with the main findings, implying that founders are not inclined to 
appoint NEDs who are more capable of overseeing their activities effectively. In contrast, 
venture capitalists tend to appoint such NEDs in the presence of founder managers. 
Finally, venture capitalists may appoint NEDs who directly represent their interests 
on a board. Such NEDs will be classifed as grey directors in terms of the definition 
discussed earlier in Section 3.2. We therefore perform additional tests to examine the 
effects of founder managers (FDR_MGD), founder ownership (FDR_OWN) and venture 
capital ownership (FDR_OWN) on the percentage of grey directors who are not related 
with the venture capitalists on a board (GREY_NVC) (Chahine & Goergen, 2011). Table 
9 reports that IPO firms with founder managers (FDR_MGD) (Model 5, p < 0.01) and 
greater founder ownership (FDR_OWN) (Model 6, p < 0.01) are still inclined not to 
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appoint such directors to a board. However, founder-managed firms with greater venture 
capital ownership (VC_OWN) still tend to appoint grey directors (GREY_NVC) even if 
these directors do not directly represent their interests (Model 7, p < 0.05). Overall, these 
results are consistent with the main findings relating to the percentage of grey directors 
reported in Tables 4 and 5. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Conclusions 
Founders and venture capitalists are influential corporate participants at the IPO 
stage. Due to the importance of a board for various corporate functions, they have 
incentives to exercise their power in designing a board structure that can protect their best 
interests in the process of going public. This research examines how a company’s 
founders and venture capitalists influence its board structure at the time of an IPO in the 
UK. Particularly, we analyse how venture capitalists are associated with board structure 
in founder-managed and non-founder-managed firms. In addition, this study awards equal 
consideration to executive, independent and grey directors, and it extends prior literature 
to address the determinants of those three different types of directors in the context of an 
IPO (Borokhovich et al., 2014; Hsu & Wu, 2014). 
The empirical results suggest that IPO firms managed by founders or with greater 
founder ownership are more likely to have a greater percentage of executive directors on 
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their boards. In addition, founder-managed IPO firms are more likely to stack their NEDs 
with more independent directors relative to grey directors. In general, venture capital 
ownership is not significantly associated with the percentages of executive, grey and 
independent directors. However, further evidence suggests that founder-managed firms 
with greater venture capital ownership are more likely to appoint more grey directors and 
fewer executive directors. 
The results of this study have implications for corporate governance literature and 
practice in relation to how influential governance participants determine board structure 
in firms undergoing dramatic changes and facing uncertainties. In line with the agency 
perspective and the conceptual argument of Harris and Raviv (2008), powerful insiders of 
entrepreneurial firms that simultaneously face increasing challenges for growth and 
intensified agency conflicts may be inclined to have a board that strengthens their 
authority and legitimacy for decision-making and avoids effective monitoring. The 
findings also demonstrate that active institutional investors may counterbalance the 
power of dominating insiders by exercising their influence to stack NEDs with directors 
who have better firm-specific information and greater incentives for monitoring duties. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis 
Variables 
Overall  Founder-managed 
 (n = 96)  
Non-founder-managed 
 (n = 114)  
   
Mean Median Std dev. 
 
Mean Median Std dev.  Mean Median 
Std 
dev.  
t-test  Wilcoxon 
test 
ED (%) 46.41 47.73 14.34  51.69 50 14.35  42.81 42.86 13.37  Ѹ4.11***  Ѹ3.97*** 
INED (%) 36.85 40 12.92  36.84 33.33 12.92  36.91 40 16.50  0.03  0.60 
GREY (%) 16.71 14.29 17.23  12.47 0 15.97  20.28 16.67 17.51  3.35***  3.69*** 
INED_NED (%) 71.51 75 28.60  78.43 100 27.09  65.69 66.67 28.66  í3.29***  í3.51*** 
FDR_MGD 0.46 0 0.50             
FDR_OWN (%) 14.07 1.35  20.37  27.83 23.90 21.56  2.49 0 8.99  í11.43***  í11.41*** 
VC_OWN (%) 4.86 0 10.60  4.28 0 10.21  5.35 0 11.01  0.72  0.83 
CEO_AGE 47.27 47.00 8.68  45.24 45 9.83  48.97 49 7.18  3.17***  3.24*** 
LEV 0.34 0.15 0.53  0.16 0.06 0.24  0.48 0.33 0.65  4.56***  5.14*** 
LnCOM_SIZ 10.76 10.60 2.09  9.81 9.80 1.73  11.55 11.56 2.05  6.56***  5.86*** 
COM_AGE 22.82 11 35.39  9.44 8 6.65  34.08 19 44.72  5.35***  5.86*** 
UNDERWRITER (%) 3.52 2.42 3.47  3.19 0.95 3.78  3.81 3.66 3.18  1.29  2.27** 
FCF í0.00 0.11 0.43  í0.08 0.1 0.53  0.07 0.11 0.30  2.49**  1.57 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, 
based on two-tailed tests. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are executive directors; INED: 
the percentage of total board members who are independent NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board 
members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; 
FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO or chairman; FDR_OWN: the 
percentage of the company shares owned by founders; VC_OWN: the percentage of the company shares 
owned by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to total assets; 
LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; COM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter 
reputation measured by the market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free 
cash flow to total assets.  
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Table 2 
Correlations among variables 
      1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11   12   
                           
1 
 
ED 1.00 
                       
2 
 
INED í0.31 *** 1.00 
                     
3 
 
GREY í0.57 *** í0.61 *** 1.00 
                   
4 
 
INED_NED 0.35 *** 0.74 *** о0.93 *** 1.00 
                 
5 
 
FDR_MGD 0.27 *** Ѹ0.00 
 
í0.23 *** 0.22 *** 1.00 
               
6 
 
FDR_OWN 0.32 *** 0.02 
 
í0.28 *** 0.25 *** 0.62 *** 1.00 
             
7 
 
VC_OWN í0.13 * í0.03 
 
0.14 ** о0.12 * í0.05 
 
í0.17 ** 1.00 
           
8 
 
CEO_AGE í0.18 ** 0.21 *** í0.04 
 
0.08 
 
í0.21 *** í0.17 ** 0.05 
 
1.00 
         
9 
 
LEV í0.10 
 
0.16 ** í0.06 
 
0.06 
 
í0.30 *** í0.21 *** 0.07 
 
0.06 
 
1.00 
       
10 
 
LnCOM_SIZ í0.41 *** 0.24 *** 0.13 * -0.09 
 
í0.41 *** í0.29 *** í0.05 
 
0.35 *** 0.09 
 
1.00 
     
11 
 
LnCOM_AGE í0.14 * 0.17 ** í0.03 
 
0.06 
 
í0.38 *** í0.25 *** í0.01 
 
0.33 *** 0.24 *** 0.42 *** 1.00 
   
12 
 
UNDERWRITER í0.31 *** 0.15 ** 0.13 
 
о0.08 
 
í0.09 
 
í0.14 * 0.06 
 
0.09 
 
0.02 
 
0.39 *** 0.05 
 
1.00 
 
13   FCF 0.08   0.14 ** í0.19 *** 0.17 ** í0.17 ** í0.06   í0.13 * 0.24 *** 0.20 *** 0.43 *** 0.38 *** 0.03 
 Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are executive 
directors; INED: the percentage of total board members who are independent NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the 
percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO or chairman; FDR_OWN: the percentage of 
the company shares owned by founders; VC_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total 
debts to total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the market share of the 
underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total assets.  
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Table 3  
OLS analysis of the relationships between founders, venture capital ownership and the 
percentage of executive directors on the board 
  (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  ED  ED 
     
FDR_MGD  4.399**   
  (2.169)   
FDR_OWN    0.130*** 
    (0.045) 
VC_OWN  í0.129  í0.098 
  (0.091)  (0.086) 
CEO_AGE  í0.082  í0.075 
  (0.110)  (0.108) 
LEV  í1.601  í1.762 
  (1.672)  (1.548) 
LnCOM_SIZ  í2.812***  í2.892*** 
  (0.624)  (0.578) 
LnCOM_AGE  0.338  0.266 
  (0.925)  (0.895) 
UNDERWRITER  í0.523*  í0.461* 
  (0.277)  (0.268) 
FCF  9.950***  9.783*** 
  (3.298)  (3.201) 
Constant  80.713***  81.300*** 
  (7.271)  (6.546) 
     
Observations  210  210 
Adj. R-squared  0.270  0.282 
F-value  13.49***  13.99*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are 
executive directors; FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO or chairman; FDR_OWN: 
the percentage of the company shares owned by founders; VC_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned 
by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: 
natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the 
market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. 
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Table 4. 
OLS analysis of the relationships between founders, venture capital ownership and the structure 
of NEDs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  INED  GREY  INED_NED  INED  GREY  INED_NED 
             
FDR_MGD  5.807**  í8.677**  15.764***       
  (2.587)  (3.371)  (5.098)       
FDR_OWN        0.105*  í0.219***  0.347*** 
        (0.054)  (0.058)  (0.104) 
VC_OWN  í0.055  0.185  í0.271  í0.035  0.136  í0.198 
  (0.101)  (0.124)  (0.192)  (0.103)  (0.117)  (0.183) 
CEO_AGE  0.253**  í0.157  0.377  0.254**  í0.166  0.388 
  (0.113)  (0.143)  (0.234)  (0.121)  (0.151)  (0.254) 
LEV  5.154***  í3.038*  4.996*  4.516***  í2.480*  3.656 
  (1.522)  (1.789)  (2.859)  (1.507)  (1.490)  (2.577) 
LnCOM_SIZ  1.376**  1.526*  í2.049*  1.109*  1.775***  í2.626** 
  (0.667)  (0.794)  (1.234)  (0.636)  (0.681)  (1.118) 
LnCOM_AGE  1.000  í1.101  2.455  0.742  í0.867  1.904 
  (1.032)  (0.985)  (1.883)  (1.008)  (0.964)  (1.845) 
UNDERWRITER  0.340  0.223  í0.114  0.414  0.106  0.093 
  (0.286)  (0.334)  (0.544)  (0.287)  (0.316)  (0.517) 
FCF  í0.729  í9.406**  12.768*  í0.553  í9.301**  12.880* 
  (2.411)  (4.188)  (6.871)  (2.433)  (4.082)  (6.724) 
Constant  2.339  13.734  62.522***  6.818  10.485  67.261*** 
  (9.539)  (11.941)  (19.065)  (8.671)  (10.206)  (18.717) 
             
Observations  210  210  210  210  210  210 
Adj. R-squared  0.129  0.124  0.106  0.119  0.134  0.103 
F-value  3.00***  5.59***  4.00***  2.88***  6.97***  4.07*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) INED: the percentage of total board members who are 
independent NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the 
percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the 
position of CEO or chairman; FDR_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by founders; VC_OWN: 
the percentage of the company shares owned by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of 
total debts to total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: 
underwriter reputation measured by the market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of 
free cash flow to total assets.  
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Table 5.  
OLS analysis of the effect of venture capital on board structure in founder-managed and non-founder-managed IPO firms 
 
 Founder-managed Firms  Non-founder-managed Firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ED INED GREY INED_NED  ED INED GREY INED_NED 
          
VC_OWN í0.385*** í0.069 0.430** í0.564*  0.077 í0.049 í0.002 í0.052 
 (0.108) (0.161) (0.211) (0.318)  (0.090) (0.137)   (0.137) (0.245) 
CEO_AGE í0.068 0.249* í0.135 0.254  í0.090 0.422** í0.423* 0.909** 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.143) (0.239)  (0.218) (0.196) (0.235) (0.363) 
LEV í1.392 í2.457 6.331 í5.137  í2.309 6.113*** í3.902* 6.375* 
 (4.551) (4.513) (6.844) (10.845)  (1.709) (1.492) (2.062) (3.334) 
LnCOM_SIZ í4.050*** 1.223 3.141*** í3.870**  í2.314*** 1.276 1.041 í1.786 
 (0.954) (0.956) (1.130) (1.945)  (0.807) (0.861) (0.910) (1.428) 
LnCOM_AGE í0.179 0.644 0.485 í0.661  0.338 0.392 í0.457 1.684 
 (1.637) (1.695) (1.969) (3.227)  (1.067) (1.192) (1.097) (2.056) 
UNDERWRITER í0.534 í0.281 0.910** í1.383*  í0.472 1.102** í0.688 1.571** 
 (0.358) (0.349) (0.456) (0.733)  (0.433) (0.449) (0.434) (0.742) 
FCF 9.984*** í2.747 í8.208** 11.563*  15.164*** 4.769 í19.659*** 24.961** 
 (3.758) (3.010) (3.899) (6.948)  (4.642) (5.036) (6.771) (9.843) 
Constant 98.758*** 13.689 í19.657 114.813***  74.022*** í6.798 36.063** 26.592 
 (8.664) (10.235) (12.076) (20.380)  (10.960) (13.083) (14.662) (24.202) 
          
Observations 96 96 96 96  114 114 114 114 
Adj. R-squared 0.341 0.065 0.233 0.118  0.124 0.190 0.160 0.159 
F-value 10.75*** 0.97 6.74*** 3.54***  4.22*** 4.70*** 4.45*** 4.18*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are executive directors; INED: the percentage of total board members who are independent 
NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; 
VC_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the age of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to total assets; 
LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the market share of the 
underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. 
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Table 6. 
OLS analysis of the effect on board structure of the presence of founders on a nomination 
committee 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
VARIABLES  ED  INED  GREY  INED_NED  
          
FDR_NC  5.091**  4.480*  í8.797**  14.344***  
  (2.331)  (2.585)  (3.516)  (5.266)  
VC_OWN  í0.127  í0.057  0.184  í0.273  
  (0.092)  (0.104)  (0.129)  (0.199)  
CEO_AGE  í0.062  0.267**  í0.190  0.428*  
  (0.108)  (0.118)  (0.147)  (0.241)  
LEV  í1.406  4.887***  í3.131*  4.781  
  (1.688)  (1.612)  (1.847)  (3.014)  
LnCOM_SIZ  í2.690***  1.308*  1.412*  í2.010  
  (0.649)  (0.664)  (0.802)  (1.231)  
LnCOM_AGE  0.165  0.675  í0.706  1.666  
  (0.908)  (0.985)  (0.964)  (1.828)  
UNDERWRITER  í0.454*  0.421  0.092  0.116  
  (0.273)  (0.290)  (0.327)  (0.547)  
FCF  9.874***  í0.526  í9.425**  13.023*  
  (3.282)  (2.424)  (4.185)  (6.911)  
Constant  78.435***  3.799  15.746  62.133***  
  (7.886)  (9.344)  (12.213)  (19.094)  
          
Observations  210  210  210  210  
Adj. R-squared  0.274  0.117  0.121  0.128  
F-value  13.74***  2.83***  4.84***  3.40***  
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on 
two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are 
executive directors; INED: the percentage of total board members who are independent NEDs; GREY: the 
percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the percentage of total NEDs who are 
independent directors; FDR_NC: the presence of a founder on nomination committee; VC_OWN: the percentage of 
the company shares owned by venture capitalists; CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to 
total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter 
reputation measured by the market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash 
flow to total assets.  
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Table 7.  
OLS regression of the effect of institutional ownership and business angel ownership on board structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ED INED GREY INED_NED  ED INED GREY INED_NED 
          
FDR_MGD 4.568** 5.974** í9.038*** 16.323***  4.561** 5.911** í8.943*** 16.151*** 
 (2.173) (2.558) (3.324) (5.015)  (2.146) (2.551) (3.284) (4.991) 
INS_OWN 0.004 0.035 -0.048 0.080      
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.048) (0.075)      
ANGEL_OWN      0.009 0.136 í0.143 0.199 
      (0.153) (0.114) (0.142) (0.237) 
CEO_AGE í0.095 0.254** í0.146 0.363  í0.097 0.242** í0.132 0.340 
 (0.107) (0.114) (0.141) (0.237)  (0.107) (0.107) (0.137) (0.224) 
LEV í1.798 5.218*** í2.943 4.902*  í1.794 5.347*** í3.032* 4.964* 
 (1.619) (1.561) (1.785) (2.835)  (1.635) (1.565) (1.789) (2.834) 
LnCOM_SIZ í2.758*** 1.380** 1.472* í1.976  í2.749*** 1.498** 1.342* í1.786 
 (0.623) (0.664) (0.788) (1.234)  (0.636) (0.664) (0.810) (1.237) 
LnCOM_AGE 0.337 0.999 í1.100 2.452  0.330 0.889 í0.984 2.291 
 (0.905) (1.030) (0.979) (1.873)  (0.920) (1.046) (0.991) (1.882) 
UNDERWRITER í0.554* 0.340 0.250 í0.150  í0.556* 0.325 0.271 í0.184 
 (0.287) (0.285) (0.347) (0.559)  (0.286) (0.284) (0.345) (0.558) 
FCF 10.414*** í0.376 í10.268** 14.080**  10.399*** í0.522 í10.064** 13.732* 
 (3.317) (2.425) (4.054) (6.651)  (3.355) (2.441) (4.228) (6.968) 
Constant 80.138*** 1.004 15.936 58.958***  0.009 0.136 í0.143 0.199 
 (7.474) (9.690) (12.348) (19.575)  (0.153) (0.114) (0.142) (0.237) 
          
Observations 210 210 210 210  210 210 210 210 
Adj. R-squared 0.261 0.130 0.115 0.101  0.261 0.131 0.114 0.100 
F-value 12.90*** 2.87*** 4.77*** 3.74 ***  13.03*** 2.99*** 4.83*** 3.66*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are executive directors; INED: the percentage of total board members who are independent 
NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; 
FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO or chairman; INS_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by institutional 
shareholders; ANGEL_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by business angels; CEO_AGE: the age of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to 
total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the market share of 
the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total assets. 
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Table 8.  
OLS regression of the effect of institutional ownership and business angel ownership on board structure in founder-managed and 
non-founder-managed IPO firms 
Panel A: Founder-managed firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ED INED GREY INED_NED  ED INED GREY INED_NED 
          
INS_OWN í0.152** í0.075 0.219*** í0.315**      
 (0.064) (0.060) (0.075) (0.123)      
ANGEL_OWN      í0.210 0.183 0.045 í0.083 
      (0.148) (0.163) (0.137) (0.275) 
CEO_AGE í0.085 0.249** í0.119 0.236  í0.111 0.257** í0.101 0.208 
 (0.120) (0.125) (0.134) (0.225)  (0.126) (0.119) (0.147) (0.244) 
LEV 2.192 -0.996 1.477 1.712  í0.605 í2.111 5.276 í3.775 
 (4.487) (4.631) (7.241) (11.149)  (4.805) (4.528) (7.343) (11.433) 
LnCOM_SIZ í3.189*** 1.578 1.970* í2.217  í4.051*** 1.458 2.940** í3.633* 
 (0.962) (0.952) (1.021) (1.766)  (1.012) (0.942) (1.208) (2.035) 
LnCOM_AGE í1.208 0.262 1.839 í2.554  í0.582 0.574 0.933 í1.249 
 (1.703) (1.675) (1.926) (3.122)  (1.623) (1.645) (1.943) (3.168) 
UNDERWRITER í0.489 í0.221 0.807* í1.216  í0.659 í0.297 1.045** í1.561* 
 (0.369) (0.354) (0.468) (0.745)  (0.407) (0.346) (0.521) (0.815) 
FCF 10.169*** í2.931 í8.190** 11.414*  10.858*** í2.595 í9.181** 12.841* 
 (3.693) (2.995) (3.562) (6.515)  (3.980) (2.999) (3.925) (7.068) 
Constant 94.765*** 12.190 í14.383 107.434***  100.918*** 10.220 í18.759 114.068*** 
 (8.866) (10.057) (11.921) (19.734)  (9.993) (10.343) (13.838) (22.026) 
          
Observations 96 96 96 96  96 96 96 96 
Adj. R-squared 0.318 0.078 0.251 0.140  0.267 0.071 0.155 0.071 
F-value 9.28*** 1.23 8.22*** 3.82***  8.24*** 1.23 7.23*** 3.77*** 
 
Panel B: Non-founder-managed firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES ED INED GREY INED_NED  ED INED GREY INED_NED 
          
INS_OWN í0.041 í0.059 0.083 í0.180      
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.087) (0.118)      
ANGEL_OWN      0.041 0.006 í0.047 0.039 
      (0.220) (0.144) (0.194) (0.310) 
CEO_AGE í0.079 0.401** í0.409* 0.867**  0.002 0.409** í0.412* 0.887** 
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 (0.212) (0.201) (0.233) (0.373)  (0.217) (0.196) (0.238) (0.368) 
LEV í2.202 5.771*** í3.640* 5.631*  í1.970 5.971*** í4.002* 6.293* 
 (1.740) (1.602) (2.126) (3.282)  (1.749) (1.605) (2.168) (3.420) 
LnCOM_SIZ í2.236*** 1.440* 0.831 í1.313  í2.305*** 1.296 1.009 í1.742 
 (0.765) (0.830) (0.839) (1.352)  (0.810) (0.861) (0.910) (1.402) 
LnCOM_AGE 0.090 0.102 í0.019 0.754  0.018 0.408 í0.426 1.679 
 (1.106) (1.239) (1.131) (2.087)  (1.087) (1.205) (1.097) (2.040) 
UNDERWRITER í0.479 1.041** í0.625 1.415*  í0.399 1.085** í0.686 1.551** 
 (0.423) (0.443) (0.431) (0.714)  (0.418) (0.446) (0.431) (0.737) 
FCF 13.993*** 4.422 í18.574*** 23.067**  14.362*** 5.164 í19.526*** 25.295** 
 (4.864) (5.026) (7.013) (9.763)  (4.483) (5.000) (6.475) (9.682) 
Constant 75.122*** í4.714 33.340** 32.690  70.679*** í6.626 35.948** 26.861 
 (11.382) (13.677) (15.151) (24.735)  (11.328) (13.179) (14.718) (24.322) 
          
Observations 114 114 114 114  114 114 114 114 
Adj. R-squared 0.124 0.195 0.170 0.177  0.119 0.189 0.160 0.159 
F-value 4.41*** 4.49*** 6.98*** 5.56***  3.99*** 4.28*** 4.30*** 4.13*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (2) ED: the percentage of total board members who are executive directors; INED: the percentage of total board members who are independent 
NEDs; GREY: the percentage of total board members who are grey directors; INED_NED: the percentage of total NEDs who are independent directors; 
INS_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by institutional shareholders; ANGEL_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by business 
angels; CEO_AGE: the age of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; 
UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total 
assets. 
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Table 9.  
OLS regression of the relationships between founders, venture capital and alternative proxies for board structure 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Founder- 
managed 
Firms 
Non-founder- 
managed Firms 
 Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Founder 
Managed Firms 
Non-founder- 
managed Firms 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 NED_COMS NED_COMS NED_COMS NED_COMS  GREY_NVC GREY_NVC GREY_NVC GREY_NVC 
          
FDR_MGD í4.114**     í8.737***    
 (2.029)     (3.352)    
FDR_OWN  Ѹ0.107**     í0.211***   
  (0.045)     (0.058)   
VC_OWN 0.142 0.118 0.407*** í0.024  0.081 0.034 0.382** í0.146 
 (0.110) (0.107) (0.143) (0.143)  (0.115) (0.105) (0.180) (0.111) 
CEO_AGE 0.032 0.027 0.090 í0.095  í0.139 í0.147 í0.082 í0.456* 
 (0.135) (0.146) (0.180) (0.155)  (0.139) (0.147) (0.136) (0.232) 
LEV í1.254 í1.008 í3.444 í1.699  í3.097* í2.475* 7.446 í3.973* 
 (1.338) (1.341) (5.383) (1.780)  (1.775) (1.475) (6.890) (2.035) 
LnCOM_SIZ 1.519*** 1.631*** 1.760** 1.655**  1.462* 1.736** 3.062*** 0.937 
 (0.506) (0.481) (0.822) (0.666)  (0.789) (0.676) (1.137) (0.896) 
LnCOM_AGE í0.931 í0.827 í0.773 í1.172  í1.100 í0.841 0.248 í0.312 
 (0.900) (0.896) (1.474) (1.059)  (0.959) (0.935) (1.980) (1.044) 
UNDERWRITER 0.352 0.296 0.561* í0.137  0.171 0.054 0.699 í0.550 
 (0.245) (0.246) (0.314) (0.390)  (0.343) (0.333) (0.496) (0.436) 
FCF 1.292 1.359 í0.977 8.385  í10.150** í10.100** í8.536** í21.678*** 
 (2.568) (2.714) (2.777) (6.518)  (4.311) (4.214) (3.923) (6.490) 
Constant 22.857*** 21.472** 11.810 30.683***  0.081 0.034 0.382** í0.146 
 (7.816) (8.322) (10.578) (9.675)  (0.115) (0.105) (0.180) (0.111) 
          
Observations 210 210 96 114  210 210 96 114 
Adj. R-squared 0.113 0.119 0.158 0.055  0.119 0.125 0.204 0.199 
F-value 4.73*** 4.95*** 4.57*** 1.69  5.17*** 6.30*** 5.00*** 5.09*** 
Notes: (1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at the p < 0.01, p < 0.05 and p < 0.1 levels, respectively, based on two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. (2) NED_COMS: the percentage of NEDs who hold membership on more than one sub-committees on board; GREY_NVC: the percentage of grey 
directors who are not representatives of venture capitalists on board; FDR_MGD: the presence of a founder who holds the position of CEO or chairman; 
FDR_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by founders; VC_OWN: the percentage of the company shares owned by venture capitalists; 
CEO_AGE: the ages of CEOs; LEV: the ratio of total debts to total assets; LnCOM_SIZ: natural log of total assets; LnCOM_AGE: company age; 
UNDERWRITER: underwriter reputation measured by the market share of the underwriter across the sample period; FCF: the ratio of free cash flow to total 
assets.  
